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The Navy Bureau of Personnel has constructed a data warehouse (PerSMART) 
for use by Navy manpower planners.  PerSMART is currently building a Retention 
Monitoring Module (RMM) intended to give Navy manpower planners a way of quickly 
assessing the impact of current and proposed policies on enlisted retention within the 
Navy.  The purpose of this thesis is to examine the structure of PerSMART and identify 
possible data and models that could be useful in the construction of the Retention 
Modeling Module (RMM).  The first part of this thesis conducts a literature review of 
studies looking at civilian and military retention and the effects of compensation, in 
particular Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRB), on retention.  The second half of this 
thesis estimates and specifies a model examining the effects of SRBs on the retention 
behavior of Zone A sailors at the reenlistment decision point during fiscal years 1995-
2001.  The model shows a positive relationship exists between SRBs and retention.  A 
one-unit increase in the SRB multiple was found to increase the probability of 
reenlistment by 3.6 percentage points on average.  However, the marginal effect varied 
across rating groups from 0.8 to 10.4 percentage points.  Finally, recommendations are 
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In recent years manpower shortfalls within the Navy have highlighted a critical 
problem with the retention of sailors, especially first-term sailors. In 1999 Golding, 
Arkes, and Koopman, [Ref. 1] conducted research into the future manpower needs of the 
Navy.  Using a 30-year forecast they predicted that technology would reduce the size of 
any required Naval fleet dramatically.  This reduction would, in turn, necessitate the 
recruiting and retention of high quality sailors who would be capable of operating and 
maintaining complicated shipboard systems.  So, while technology would reduce the 
number of personnel needed, the cost for those personnel would increase.  The need for 
drastic change to the current pay system will be necessary in order to retain the sailor of 
the future.  The enlisted force would shift from being predominately blue collar to being 
overwhelmingly white collar in make-up. 
 The widely publicized military/civilian pay gap has been identified as the main 
reason so many sailors choose to leave the Navy at the end of their first obligation rather 
than stay. [Ref 2] The retention problem has reached extreme proportions in many of the 
Navy’s technology intensive ratings. [Ref. 2]  With first-term attrition currently running 
at approximately 40 percent, solving the retention crisis has become a critical readiness 
issue.   
Until recently the Navy did not have a single source, except the Enlisted Master 
File (EMF), from which essential personnel data, such as marital status, military pay, or 
sea time could be accumulated for use by Navy retention manpower planners.  It is 
crucial that Navy leadership have current and accurate retention data in order to make 
informed decisions regarding personnel policies and initiate legislative action.  To this 
end PerSMART, a personnel data warehouse, is currently under construction.  
PerSMART, which began in 1999, provides historical retention, reenlistment, and 
attrition statistics to manpower planners. [Ref. 3]  Historical data can then be analyzed 
and used to predict likely future retention behavior.  Historical data can also be used to 
predict future retention behavior by age cohorts, individual ratings, and groups of ratings. 
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The PerSMART data warehouse will also incorporate a Retention Monitoring System 
(RMS). 
Classifying sailors by cohort and rating (or groups of ratings) could be especially 
useful when looking at the likely future intentions of sailors as they approach critical 
career milestones, such as their first End of Active Obligated Service (EAOS).  The 
historical retention behavior of sailors in a particular Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) 
code or rating maybe a good predictor of future behavior, holding constant external 
factors such as falling unemployment or a significant increase in the military/civilian pay 
gap. 
As an enlisted data warehouse PerSMART collects both current and historical 
personnel data.  This data warehouse maintains and facilitates access to personnel data by 
manpower planners.  In the past this data was scattered across a wide spectrum of 
sources, some of which could not be accessed on a consistent or timely basis.  To make 
matters worse, historical data was often not maintained, which further complicated the 
efforts of many would-be users.  A key element of any successful data warehouse is the 
consistent and continual updating of information.  This information needs to be placed in 
a standard format recognizable to most users.  This allows manpower planners to make 
relatively timely predictions about future behavior.  PerSMART is currently updated 
regularly from the EMF.  Pre-selected data segments are then placed into fact tables 
representing various retention statistics.  These fact tables are currently under 
construction.  One problem has been the ability to locate information on military pay and 
allowances, as well as data on factors such as the amount of time a sailor has spent at sea.  
Much of the information must be pulled from multiple sources, which requires a 
significant investment of time and manpower.   
 One of the more important elements of retention has always been compensation.  
A wide variety of pay and allowances exist for sailors and are usually dependent upon the 
rating in which the sailor works.  Changes in compensation can have far-reaching effects, 
which cannot be easily quantified in the absence of accurate historical data.  Currently, 
the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) is one of the Navy’s most cost effective 
retention tools.  The SRB allows Navy manpower planners to target sailors with technical 
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skills who are likely to leave the service, and avoid over-compensating sailors who would 
likely stay even without an increase in pay.  The SRB also improves the Navy’s ability to 
respond quickly to an unforeseen retention crisis in a particular rating. [Ref 4] This is 
extremely important in an era of tight budgets and high operational demands. The SRB is 
reevaluated on an annual basis and changes within the fiscal year, based on current 
manning shortfalls.  
In recent years, most notably FY 2000 and FY 2001, defense budgets have 
stressed the need for an increase in military compensation.  Not only have monetary 
incentives such as base pay, SRB’s, and sea pay been increased, but non-monetary 
compensation has been improved as well.  Quality of life issues like better housing, more 
access to childcare, time off, reduced underway time, and increased health care services 
have been in the congressional spotlight.  In order to better understand the effects of non-
monetary compensation PerSMART will need to maintain information on personal 
demographics.  The combination of these variables along with the monetary 
compensation variables will allow Navy manpower planners to formulate accurate 
behavioral models.  These models will make up the core of a decision support system for 
use by both the military and civilian leadership of the Navy. 
B. PURPOSE 
As previously mentioned, when completed, the PerSMART data warehouse will 
consist of personnel data from a variety of sources.  The main source is the EMF, but 
other sources should be examined as complements to the existing data.  PerSMART 
contains a module known as the Retention Monitoring System (RMS).  The purpose of 
RMS is to enable researchers to calculate retention rates for sailors according to their 
rating and personal demographic characteristics.  In order to support the requirements of 
the RMS a Retention Modeling Module (RMM) is also currently under development.  
The RMM will contain various retention and reenlistment models utilizing different 
segments of the data sets contained in PerSMART.  These retention models will use 
specific statistical analysis techniques and attempt to predict likely retention behavior 
given a specific set of individual, as well as aggregate, variables.  The RMM will 
facilitate the analysis of specific proposed legislative changes as well as changes in the 
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external environment, such as the national unemployment rate.  Using the RMM 
scenarios Navy manpower planners will be able to calculate the necessary SRB changes 
needed in order to offset factors that might cause drops in future retention.  This would 
greatly improve the Navy’s ability to meet current readiness requirements while retaining 
highly skilled sailors. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Currently PerSMART maintains data inputs from the EMF.  The purpose of this 
study is to more fully explore those data inputs and to identify data sources other than the 
EMF that would be needed to augment the RMM.  To this end this study seeks to answer 
the following questions: 
• What data are needed to model retention behavior in a manner consistent 
with current literature on the topic? 
 
• How well does the current structure of PerSMART support retention 
modeling? 
 
• What data fields should be added to PerSMART to support retention 
modeling?  
 
• What are the predicted effects of compensation on retention according to 
data elements that exist and/or may be incorporated into PerSMART?   
 
D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis conducts a thorough literature review of past and current retention 
studies focusing on relevant findings as well as on modeling approaches.  The 
identification of various sources of data (such as civilian pay and unemployment rates) 
relevant to the proposed RMM is one of the main goals of this study.  Finally, a retention 
model will be specified and estimated using data from PerSMART and standard 
modeling techniques.  The model will reveal the strengths and weaknesses of the current 
data available in PerSMART (and in the EMF) to populate the RMM.   
The methodology utilized in this thesis is as follows:  (1) a thorough review all 
applicable books, articles, research studies, and other sources; (2) an audit of existing 
modeling techniques; and (3) the estimation of a multivariate retention model utilizing 
existing data from PerSMART. 
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E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The remaining part of the thesis is organized into the following sections. 
Chapter II.  Theoretical Framework and Literature Review.  This chapter provides 
an overview of the SRB program, describes the general structure of an Annualized Cost 
of Leaving (ACOL) model, and reviews past as well as current retention studies relevant 
to the estimation of a retention model. 
Chapter III.  Model Development.  This chapter describes the analysis data set, 
the specification of a multivariate model for reenlistment, and the expected effects of 
explanatory variables on the probability of reenlisting. 
Chapter IV.  Data Analysis.  This chapter discusses the analytical results of 
applying a multivariate retention model to the analysis data set. 
Chapter V.  Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations.  This chapter 
summarizes the findings from the research and provides recommendations for future 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
This chapter reviews various retention modeling approaches adopted by 
researchers of turnover of private sector workers.  These approaches are compared to 
those adopted to model military turnover. 
A. ANNUALIZED COST OF LEAVING (ACOL) MODEL OVERVIEW 
The Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model was developed to allow 
researchers the ability to predict the future reenlistment behavior of service members at 
the End of Active Obligated Service (EAOS).  The ACOL model is currently the primary 
model used by researchers to predict Navy retention behavior.  Prior to the ACOL model, 
the Navy used historical continuation data to predict future retention.  Historical data 
provided accurate predictions only when no important changes in economic factors were 
expected.  The ACOL model explicitly hypothesizes that a service member’s decision to 
reenlist is predicated on the perceived economic costs and benefits (or utility) of the 
alternatives realized from either reenlisting or leaving immediately. 
The alternative occupational choices, military vs. civilian sectors, differ in terms 
of monetary factors such as salary, fringe benefits, and non-monetary factors such as job 
satisfaction, time off, job related stress, and the work environment.  The decision to 
reenlist or leave is based upon which combination yields the most utility (or net economic 
benefits) to the service member. 
The ACOL model relies on the assumption that individuals behave rationally, and 
that people will attempt to maximize benefits when making their decision to stay or 
leave. [Ref. 5]  ACOL takes into account expected future earnings and assigns monetary 
values to the non-monetary compensation items.  These expected future earnings are then 
discounted into present values.  The annualized cost of leaving is the difference between 
the present value of both the military and civilian options, expressed on an annual basis 
over the future time horizon.  When ACOL is positive then the model assumes that the 
service member will reenlist; when it is negative the service member will leave active 
duty. 
One searches over all possible lengths of stay to determine the 
optimal length of stay at a given decision point.  The financial returns 
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associated with the optimal length of stay are then compared with the 
financial incentive of leaving immediately.  The ACOL value is the net 
financial incentive to stay if positive or leave if negative.  It is calculated 
as the annualized difference in the financial rewards from staying to the 
optimal leaving point relative to leaving immediately. [Ref. 6] 
 
Warner and Asch provided a mathematical statement of the ACOL model. [Ref. 
7]  The ACOL model incorporates the following variables when explaining an 
individual’s decision to stay or leave: 
 WMj  =  expected military pay in each future year j 
 WCj,t =  expected civilian earnings in future year j if the individual retires at time t 
 WCj,n =  expected civilian earnings in future year j if the individual separates after  
                         future year n 
 Rn      =  expected present value at future year n of retired pay and other separation  
                          benefits if the individual separates after future year n 
 Rt      =  expected present value at year t of retired pay and other separation 
                          benefits if the individual leaves now 
 τm       =  preference for the military lifestyle 
 τc        =  preference for the civilian  lifestyle 
ρ =  the individual’s subjective discount rate on future income 
St,n     =  the present value of the future benefit from staying from period t to  
               period n 
Lt       =  the value of leaving immediately 
Ct,n     =  the cost of leaving 
The present value of the future benefit of staying from period t through period n 
(St,n) is calculated in the model as follows:   
 





























Thus, if the individual stays to some future point, n, he accrues military pay 
(WMj), the monetary equivalent of non-pecuniary benefits, and retirement pay (Rn).  
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Since, ACOL is a utility maximization model, the individuals “taste” for the military 
lifestyle, τm, must also be counted. 




The Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) is (St,n – Lt).  A positive value of ACOL 
over any time horizon predicts that the service member reenlists.  A negative value of 
ACOL predicts that the service member leaves.  The ACOL model is the most widely 
used model when trying to predict future retention for the Navy today. 
B. SRB PROGRAM OVERVIEW AND ZONES 
The ACOL model incorporates mostly economic factors in the formulation.  One 
of the monetary factors that varies across ratings is the Selective Reenlistment Bonus 
(SRB).  Variations in SRB are a key source of variation in military pay in the ACOL 
model. 
The SRB is offered to enlisted members in critical skills, those facing manning 
shortages, as needed in order to achieve retention goals.  Enlisted members who elect to 
receive the SRB are obligated for a specific length of service in the rating for which the 
SRB is paid.  The SRB program not only allows the Navy to address manning shortfalls 
in critical ratings but also reduces total cost of personnel to the Navy.  Personnel cost 
savings come in the form of saved replacement costs and by allowing the Navy to pay 
only those members in ratings where retention is below acceptable minimums. 
SRB levels are reviewed periodically to determine the amount of SRB to be 
authorized for each skill/rating group.  This allows the Navy to adjust SRB levels as 
retention levels and readiness conditions dictate. 
Skill groups are assigned criticality factors ranging from 0 to 15.  These factors 
are then multiplied by the service member’s monthly base pay and years of obligated 
service to be incurred.  The resulting product is the dollar amount of SRB that the service 
member can receive. The payment, however, cannot exceed predetermined levels 
















dollars.  The electing service member receives 50 percent of the SRB at the initial service 
obligation and the rest is paid out in equal annual installments for the duration of 
obligated service. 
Three zones of eligibility exist for the SRB.  Zone A consists of those service 
members currently having between 21 months and six years of active duty.  Zone A 
covers those sailors at the end of their first obligation. Zone B consists of service 
members currently having between six years and ten years of active duty (the second 
term reenlistment point), and Zone C consists of those members currently having 
between ten years and 14 years of active duty (the third term reenlistment point).  Each 
zone has different SRB factors used to determine SRB levels.  Only one SRB may be 
awarded per enlistment and each SRB service obligation must take the service member 
into the next SRB zone. 
Minimum eligibility requirements must be met in order to receive the SRB.  The 
service member must have attained the rank of E-3 at the time of obligation of service 
and must be within three months of discharge from active duty when reenlisting or 
extending.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Among the major challenges facing today’s Navy is the fight to attract and retain 
high quality personnel.  High turnover rates have forced the Navy to increase funding for 
both retention and recruiting while pulling funds away from acquisition and readiness 
programs needed to prepare the force for a new era of warfare and the “war on 
terrorism.”  The effect has been to produce a shortage of funds across the board in most 
major programs.  Recent defense budgets have acknowledged the shortfalls and funding 
levels have risen.  Despite this, it is imperative that the Navy continue research on critical 
topics such as turnover and compensation. 
While this thesis deals with military retention, it also may be useful to look at 
turnover and compensation factors as they pertain to retention behavior associated with 
civilian organizations.  Some factors may elicit the same retention response across all 
spectrums of workers.  The first two sections of this literature review examine studies 
aimed at the civilian sector provide an overview of key factors that have been shown to 
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affect retention behavior.  The final section looks specifically at studies of the military 
with specific emphasis on the effects of compensation on retention behavior. 
1. Non-Economic Studies of Retention in Non-Military Organizations 
 In 1977 Mobley [Ref. 8], expanding on past research into the resignation process, 
suggested that far more was involved in the decision to quit than simple job 
dissatisfaction.  Mobley believed that negative attitudes toward one’s job led to thoughts 
of quitting.  At this point the individual would begin to investigate the consequences of 
actually quitting.  Some factors likely to be examined would be the likelihood of finding 
another job of equal or greater perceived value, the cost of quitting to the individual and 
how extensive the job search would likely be.  If the individual believed that the chances 
of finding a favorable job were high then the actual search for new employment 
opportunities would begin in earnest.  The end result would be the individual actually 
finding alternative employment and quitting the current job.  Mobley, Homer, and 
Hollingsworth [Ref. 9] looked at Mobley’s previous research and concluded that job 
dissatisfaction has an effect on thoughts of quitting but very little influence on the actual 
act of quitting. 
The role individual expectations play in the turnover process was investigated by 
Porter and Steers [Ref. 10] in 1973.  When an individual takes a position within an 
organization there likely exists expectations the individual brings along.  Porter and 
Steers found a positive correlation between job satisfaction and met expectations. The 
number of employees who stay with an organization increases as the perception of met 
expectations increases.  The conclusion was that expectations greatly influence the 
turnover process. 
In 1994 Lee and Mitchell [Ref. 11] expanded the area of turnover research by 
proposing the idea of a shock to the system influencing the turnover process.  Previous 
research had focused on job satisfaction variables as the main factors in employee 
turnover.  The model suggested that the employee first experiences a shock to the system 
in the form of a traumatic event.  This event causes the employee to begin participation in 
the turnover process, which leads to actual turnover.  The model suggested four possible 
paths affecting the turnover event. 
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In the first scenario the shock simply pushes the employee to rethink past 
experiences with the turnover process and this in turn starts the employee thinking about 
applying the past experience to the current situation.  In the second scenario the employee 
is so traumatized by the shock that he questions his fit within the organization as well as 
his commitment to it.  If the employee decides that a negative situation exists he quits 
without participating in the lengthy turnover process.  The third scenario starts the 
employee on the traditional path of the turnover process.  In the fourth scenario the 
employee experiences no shocks to the system.  The employee simply becomes 
dissatisfied and begins the turnover process.  One difference here is that the employee is 
as likely to quit abruptly as he is to follow the traditional turnover process. 
In 1996 Lee, Mitchell, Wise, and Fireman followed up on Lee and Mitchell’s 
previous work. [Ref.12] Researchers conducted a series of interviews with 44 nurses who 
had voluntarily left their jobs.  This research, while failing to validate all of Lee and 
Mitchell’s previous findings, did support their model.  Some 45 percent of the 
interviewees indicated that they had left jobs without waiting for follow on employment 
opportunities.  Fifty-five percent of the interviewees followed the traditional course of the 
turnover process and 58 percent stated that some kind of trauma inducing event had 
precipitated the decision to leave. 
2. Other Non-Economic Studies of Turnover 
Turnover is the process by which employees end their relationship with the 
organization.  Turnover is not simply the act of quitting one’s job. Pearson [Ref. 13] 
explains turnover as the combination of variables leading to the decision to terminate 
employment and the behavior displayed while coming to the actual decision. 
Arnold and Feldman [Ref. 14] noted that most studies directed at explaining the 
turnover phenomenon rely on similar sets of variables, including job attitudes (e.g., 
satisfaction, commitment) and demographic variables (e.g., marital status, age).  They 
found that the model with the greatest explanatory value (R = .44) contained the 
following significant individual predictor variables:  tenure, job satisfaction, perceived 
job security, and intention to search for an alternate position.  These variables are easily 
obtained and could provide great value in predicting future turnover rates.   
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Aggregate turnover, as defined as the turnover rate of an organization, appears to 
be strongly correlated with aggregate economic data such as the unemployment rate.  
However, Cotton and Tuttle [Ref. 15] found that aggregate national economic data did 
not correlate well with individual turnover behavior. They concluded that while the 
unemployment rate might be useful in understanding organizational turnover it is not 
reliable in helping to predict an individual’s probability of staying with the organization 
in question.  However many other economic studies have found just the opposite to be 
true. 
Employee turnover within an organization falls into two separate categories: 
voluntary and involuntary.  McEvoy and Cascio [Ref. 16] described the voluntary 
turnover process resulting in resignation, and the involuntary turnover process resulting 
from a disability, layoff or mandatory retirement.  What is not clear is the role 
organizational culture and direction setting played in the turnover process.  Much of the 
current turnover research suggests that organizational human resource policies, such as 
retirement programs, health benefits, and incentive pay programs, have a significant 
impact on the voluntary turnover process as well. [Ref. 6]   
One major problem faced when researching the turnover process is in 
understanding the motivation behind it.  Voluntary turnover has both positive and 
negative effects on the participants. [Ref. 17]  For the organization it can increase 
inefficiency, costs, training requirements, and recruiting efforts.  Turnover also interrupts 
the natural rhythm associated with groups of employees who are used to working 
together for long periods of time. Involuntary turnover can cut costs and improve morale 
by increasing promotion opportunities. However, voluntary turnover can have positive 
effects on the organization as well.  If turnover increases promotion opportunities for 
those who stay, organizational morale will improve as well. 
  The individual participant in the turnover process, both voluntary as well as 
involuntary, can experience negative side effects such as a loss of seniority, benefits, 
prestige, self-esteem, and monetary compensation.  At the other end of the spectrum are 
positive effects such as finding a better job, more money, increased self-esteem, 
improved family relationships, and less stress. 
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Turnover within an organization is unavoidable and at times necessary.  The goal 
of understanding the turnover process is to provide organizations with the ability to better 
control voluntary turnover in order to maintain positive control over the turnover process.  
However, the turnover process differs greatly when comparing the military or military-
like organizations with non-military organizations.  Since culture and human resource 
policies differ greatly between civilian and military organizations it seems likely that the 
turnover process would differ greatly as well.  Because of this difference it is necessary to 
clearly define the differences between the two styles. 
3. Turnover in Military Organizations 
Military organizations operate under somewhat different circumstances than non-
military organizations.  When an individual decides to accept employment with the 
military he volunteers for duty for a contractual period of time.  While the length of time 
may vary from person to person the requirements for termination of employment do not.  
Other than being administratively separated for poor performance or violations of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the individual service member has very few 
avenues by which to legally turnover prior to their EAOS.  This does not preclude the 
member from participating in the traditional turnover process; however, it simply implies 
a longer time frame over which the process unfolds.  While this seems to suggest that an 
individual joining the military commits more than does his civilian counterpart, very little 
research has been done to support this assumption.  Most research pertaining to military 
turnover focuses on compensation and quality of life issues when trying to explain 
military turnover.  The ACOL model has been the most widely used tool when trying to 
explain retention behavior in the military.  
Cymrot [Ref.18] looked at the effects of selected reenlistment bonuses (SRB’s) on 
reenlistment in the Marine Corps. Using the Annualized Cost of Living (ACOL), model 
Cymrot aggregated marine occupational specialties into 22 groups and assumed that 
individuals in comparable skill groups would have similar responses to the SRB.  Cymrot 
divided each group into the same zones the military uses to differentiate between skill 
levels when determining who is eligible for bonuses.  Sailors between 21 months and six 
years are in Zone A; sailors with between six and ten years of service are in Zone B; and 
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Zone C consists of sailors with between ten and 14 years of service.  Cymrot found that 
the SRB multiple was positively correlated with reenlistment in each group and zone.  
For example, if the SRB multiple for Zone A was increased from zero to one for any skill 
set, Cymrot found that reenlistment rates increased by more than 13 percent. Cymrot also 
found that the national unemployment rate had an effect on reenlistment in Zone A but 
not in Zones B and C.  A one percent increase in the unemployment rate resulted in a 4.3 
percent increase in retention of members in Zone A.  
Mehay’s 2001 survey of existing retention studies on retention [Ref. 19] describes 
one of the earliest efforts at using ACOL by Warner and Goldberg. [Ref. 20]  Using five 
years of data (1974-78), the authors looked at reenlistment decisions of first term Navy 
personnel.  Navy ratings were divided into 16 separate groups based on similarities of 
training, job requirements, and working conditions, and retention models were estimated 
for each group.  Some of the variables used were the ACOL variable, SRB multiple, 
marital status, and the national unemployment rate in the month of each member’s 
decision.   
Warner and Goldberg concluded that the value of ACOL was a maximum at the 
four-year reenlistment point.   This implied that retirement pay was not a significant 
factor in the decision to reenlist by sailors in the first term.  Their pay elasticities 
averaged 2.35 across all 16 groups.  The average effect of a one-level increase in SRB on 
the predicted reenlistment rate was a 3.2 percentage point increase across all groups.  
Warner and Goldberg also found that the pay elasticity was significantly 
influenced by expected sea duty.  Expected sea duty was defined as the proportion of 
personnel in an individual’s rating who were assigned to sea duty in the next four length 
of service (LOS) cells immediately following the LOS cell of the sailor at the decision 
point.  For groups whose members expected greater amounts of sea duty during their next 
tour the pay effects were less elastic. That is, the effect of a given change in military pay 
was smaller in ratings with higher expected sea duty.  Further, the fraction of time spent 
on sea duty had a significantly negative effect on first-term reenlistment rates. They also 
found that marital status was a significant predictor; their model predicted a higher 
reenlistment rate for married service members compared to single service members.  
 16
In 2001 Goldberg conducted a survey of military reenlistment research titled “A 
Survey of Enlisted Retention: Models and Findings”. [Ref. 21]  Goldberg focused on 
estimated first-term pay elasticities as well as the effects of one-level SRB increases on 
enlisted retention in the literature.  His survey of pay elasticities and SRB effects are 
reproduced in Table 2.1.  Goldberg found that the majority of first-term pay elasticity 
estimates in the literature are between 1.2 and 2.2.  The estimated effects of a one-level 
increase in the SRB on reenlistment rates across the military in the literature range 
between 1.5 and 3.0.  Estimates vary greatly depending on whether or not the study used 
grouped or individual data and the exact specification of the estimating model. 
Goldberg noted that some retention models contain variables other than pay, such 
as the civilian unemployment rate, and various demographic variables including marital 
status, race, education, and aptitude.  One concern when these variables are included in 
the model is that they are often used to predict civilian pay, which is then used to 
compute the military-civilian pay ratio or the ACOL variable.  This can cause 
multicollinearity, increasing the variance of the estimated coefficient of relative pay.  If 
the purpose of the model is to explain the effect of pay on retention one might want to 
exclude personal demographic variables from the model.  However, it should be noted 
that the estimated parameter on pay will still be unbiased in the presence of 
multicollinearity. 
In 1992 Cooke and Quester [Ref. 22] used logit models to find a relationship 
between a recruit’s background traits and the completion of obligated service.  Using 
only Navy first-term male recruits who enlisted for four years between 1978 and 1982, 
Cooke and Quester looked at the predictive value of background characteristics on 
success in the Navy. Success was defined as completing the initial enlistment, being 
eligible to reenlist, and either reenlisting or extending the service contract. What they 
found was that AFQT category and High School Diploma Status (HSDG) were highly 
significant when predicting retention with this particular set of recruits.  This study 
showed that high school graduation, above average Armed Forces Qualification Test 
Battery (AFQT) scores, and participation in the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) were all 
associated with a higher propensity for success in the Navy.  
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Table 2.1.  First-Term Pay Elasticities from Various Studies.   
    Sample Pay SRB 
Study Pay Variable Restrictions Elasticity Effect* 
Black, Hogan, and ACOL-2; Navy enlisted 0.8-0.9  
Sylwester (1987) but elasticity of    
 reenlistment    
 with respect to     
 military pay    
Cooke, Marcus, Military/civilian Navy enlisted 1.6 2.5 (I) 
and Quester (1992) pay index; SRB       
Daula and Moffitt Military/civilian Army infantry 1.2  
(1991) pay difference    
Daula and Moffitt Military/civilian Army infantry 0.5   
(1995) pay difference    
 Military pay alone Army infantry 2.2  
  ACOL-2 Army infantry 0.8   
Goldberg and Total retention; Navy enlisted, 1.1-2.7 1.5-3.0 (I) 
Warner (1982) military pay by occupational  2.0-3.9 (L) 
 alone (RMC) group   
Hosek and  Military/civilian Enlisted males; 3.6 1.8 (I) 
Peterson (1985) pay index; SRB four services   2.5 (L) 
Mackin (1996) ACOL-2; Army enlisted 1.2  
 but elasticity of Navy enlisted 1.0  
 reenlistment USAF enlisted 0.5  
 with respect to  USMC enlisted 1.4  
 military pay    
Mackin et al. (1996), Reenlistment; Navy enlisted; 0.2-1.5 0.4-2.8 (I) 
conditional logit Military pay alone by occupational   
model  group   
 Total retention;  0.2-0.9  
  Military pay alone       
Shiells and Military/civilian Navy enlisted 1.9  
McMahon (1993) pay index;SRB    
Smith et al. (1991) Military pay alone Army infantry 1.3 2.2 (I) 
  Army maintenance 1.8  
    Army administration 1.9   
Warner and  Military pay alone Navy enlisted, 1.1-3.4 1.8-5.5 (I) 
Goldberg (1984) (SRB) by occupational   
  group   
Warner and Solon ACOL; but elasticity Army infantry 1.2   
(1991) of reenlistment with    
 respect to military    
  pay       
*SRB effect on reenlistment (not total retention) rate is measured in percentage points, 
 payment type = installment (I) or lump-sum (L).   
Source: [Ref. 21]     
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 Doering and Grissmer [Ref. 23] conducted a study in 1985 and concluded that 
pay grade was the single most important factor when trying to explain military retention.  
That same year Goldberg [Ref. 24] conducted a study looking at the effect military 
compensation and employment opportunities in the civilian market had on military 
retention for enlisted service members.   Military compensation had a significant effect 
on retention while civilian employment opportunities were not statistically significant. 
Boesel and Johnson analyzed the effects of family size and marital status on 
retention. [Ref. 25]  Their literature review of existing studies concluded that married 
members and married members with children were more likely to separate.  However, 
numerous other researchers have contradicted these conclusions. In particular, Buddin 
(1981) and Greenberg (1977) found just the opposite to be true, as did Warner and 
Goldberg (1984). [Ref. 20]  The model estimated in this thesis concurs with the 
hypothesis that married members are more likely to stay then their single counterparts. 
Quality of life issues took on new importance during the 1990’s.  In 1998 the 
General Accounting Office (GAO) looked at this issue at the behest of Congress.  As the 
size of the Navy’s deployable force structure shrank and commitments remained the same 
a new trend began to emerge.  Forced to accomplish the same commitments with less, 
Navy force structure had begun to increase the operations tempo of its ships.  Initially the 
impact on retention was hardly noticeable.  Late in the 1990s, when the drawdown was 
beginning to come to an end, people were still being pushed out.  However, as soon as the 
drawdown was complete and the force size stabilized, retention dropped to an all time 
low.  The GAO’s survey found that base pay was only one of many factors cited by 
personnel who stated they intended to leave the Navy.  Other factors included, access to 
childcare, deployment schedules, the amount of liberty, and increasing numbers of 
gapped billets (which created more work for everyone else).   
In 1999 two RAND Corporation researchers, Asch and Hosek [Ref. 26], 
examined the effects of long duty on retention.  Long duty was defined as 30 or more 
consecutive days of separation.  They found that long duty resulted in decreased retention 
among first-term sailors.  Implications of their findings are that sea duty could be a cause 
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of lowered retention rates for first-term sailors, since sailors on sea duty often experience 
long periods of separation. 
Comparing military to civilian pay takes into account education levels and 
occupational fields.  It does not factor in the risks associated with military service.  Risk, 
while not accounted for, nonetheless raises the reservation wage for individuals 
considering military service.  Asch and Hosek advised that enlisted pay should be above 
that of the civilian counterpart in order to retain motivated personnel and maintain 
readiness.    
In 2000 Hansen [Ref. 27] examined the manning levels among enlisted ratings to 
see if manning shortfalls in enlisted ratings were linked to the civilian earnings potential 
of workers in each occupation.  Civilian opportunities vary greatly between ratings and, 
as expected, technical ratings had the best civilian opportunities and the biggest manning 
shortfalls in the Navy.   
Hansen compared the enlisted pay actually received by an individual in a specific 
rating to the compensation received by civilians in comparable occupations.  He noted 
that it can be difficult to accurately match Navy enlisted ratings to a civilian counterpart.  
For example, a Navy Mess Management Specialist has a direct counterpart in many 
civilian food service specialties, where as a Gunners Mate does not. Hansen used the 
Defense Manpower Data Center’s (DMDC) conversion manual to link Navy ratings to an 
Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) code used to identify civilian occupations. 
This is one of the very few sources of information on rating-specific civilian earnings 
data.   
Hansen found a positive correlation between military compensation and actual 
reenlistment.  Hansen believed that SRBs would be the most sensible way to induce 
higher reenlistment, especially among the high-demand technical ratings or those that are 
critically undermanned. 
As previously discussed, military turnover and retention behavior differs from 
that of workers in comparable civilian organizations.  Legal service obligations, the risks 
associated with military service, and the individual’s sense of duty, are all unique aspects 
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of military organizations that affect retention.  However, individual responses to factors 
like compensation, unemployment rates and quality of life may be similar. 
The studies reviewed here represent a cross-section of the type and scope of 
research that has been conducted for the purpose of understanding turnover and retention 
behavior of military service members.  The current research suggests that data such as 
military pay (including SRBs), personal demographic variables (marital status, number of 
dependents, race, and aptitude), and external economic factors such the unemployment 
rate are essential to any model examining military retention behavior.  Further, the review 
shows that the ACOL approach is an essential modeling technique when looking at 
military retention and turnover.  Finally, the review shows that the SRB is a highly 





                          
 21




In this chapter we describe the process of specifying a multivariate model of 
reenlistment behavior.  The model is designed to utilize data available from the Retention 
Monitoring System (RMS) contained in PerSMART, and emphasis is made on the 
examination of the specific effects that Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRBs) have on 
first term reenlistment decisions.  Analysis of the multivariate model will determine the 
predicted probability that an enlisted person in SRB Zone A will reenlist based on 
selected independent variables.   
SAG Corporation, who helped develop the PerSMART data warehouse, provided 
the data set analyzed.  The data were extracted from a number of separate tables in the 
RMS.  The data set contained selected Enlisted Master File (EMF) information on the 
389,921 enlisted members who extended, reenlisted, or left the Navy during fiscal years 
1995 through 2001.  The Appendix provides definitions of the data fields contained in the 
RMS extract.  Since the RMS was not designed to be a research database, the model and 
data used in this analysis will examine the strengths and weaknesses of the current 
PerSMART structure in supporting retention modeling. [Ref. 28] 
B. DATA RESTRICTIONS 
This analysis is concerned specifically with those individuals who are considered 
to be in SRB Zone A when they are making their reenlistment decisions.  Zone A is 
defined to include sailors who have at least 21 months and no more than six years of 
active duty service.  Some enlisted members may still be in service schools or other 
training courses at the 21-month point and would not share the same military experiences 
as the majority of sailors who have served in the fleet prior to their decision points.  Thus, 
the final data set included only those with at least two and no more than six years of 
service. 
Some sailors may not be eligible for reenlistment at their decision point for a 
number of administrative reasons.  Weight control problems, misconduct, and drug use 
are just a few of the conditions that make a sailor ineligible for reenlistment 
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consideration.  If a sailor is not eligible to reenlist, then he or she is not eligible for an 
SRB.  Loss and reenlistment codes from the RMS extract data set (Dod_Loss_Code, 
Navy_Loss_Rqc) allow the researcher to identify those who are not eligible to reenlist.  
To better analyze the effects of SRBs on reenlistment, only those individuals who were 
voluntarily released or discharged at the completion of their required active duty service 
and were eligible for reenlistment or preferred reenlistment were included in the data set 
as leavers.  Taking into account all constraints that were made to this point, the data set 
included 179,316 Zone A sailors who reenlisted, extended, or separated from fiscal years 
1995-2001. 
 At the reenlistment decision point, some sailors may choose to extend their 
enlistment contracts rather than reenlist for another full term.  These extensions may be 
short or long term.  Short-term extensions may be from one to 23 months long and are 
generally executed for administrative reasons, such as for continued maternity benefits, 
or to match the end of service obligation to the projected rotation date from the current 
duty assignment.  Long-term extensions are from 24 to 48 months and are often taken for 
a variety of reasons, including shorter commitments or delays of reenlistment to receive 
bonuses in tax-exempt combat zones.  Sailors who are not eligible to reenlist cannot 
extend, and extenders are not eligible to receive an SRB.  Since the decision to extend is 
not the same as the decision to reenlist, and since the focus of this analysis is on the 
effects of SRBs, people who extended were deleted from the analysis data set using the 
data field “code.”  This field describes the reenlistment decision and was assigned to each 
observation when the data set was extracted from the RMS.  It identifies whether a sailor 
extended (“code” = 3), reenlisted (“code” = 4) or separated (“code” = 7).  The final 
analysis data set that included only Zone A sailors who reenlisted or separated in fiscal 
years 1995-2001 contained 173,735 observations.  In other words, 5,581 Zone A sailors 
extended their enlistment contracts during this period. 
C. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
1. Dependent Variable 
The purpose of the multivariate model is to analyze the independent effects of 
selected explanatory variables on the decision to reenlist.  Consequently, the dependent 
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variable for the model is constructed as a dichotomous variable representing an 
individual’s decision to either reenlist or leave the Navy.  The variable REENL is coded 
as a ‘1’ if the sailor reenlists and as a ‘0’ if the sailor chooses to separate. 
2. Explanatory Variables 
Specification of the retention model is based primarily on the literature reviewed 
in Chapter II and on the availability of data for the variables from both the original data 
set and other sources.  Based on prior studies of military retention, a preliminary model 
of reenlistment for Zone A Navy enlisted members can be specified as follows: 
  Reenlistment = f (ACOL, X1, …,Xk). 
  
ACOL is the Annualized Cost of Leaving variable that estimates the present value of the 
individual’s net economic benefits associated with leaving the service at a decision point, 
and the Xs represent the other k independent variables that are expected to have an effect 
on reenlistment.  Such variables may include expected sea duty, gender, family status, 
race, Selective Reenlistment Bonuses, civilian unemployment rates, education, and 
aptitude test scores (AFQT).  The individual variables actually used to specify the model 
in this thesis are described in the following sections. 
a. Paygrade 
When specifying a variable to be used to analyze the effects of pay on 
reenlistment, the literature supports either an ACOL variable or a military-civilian pay 
ratio.  The ACOL approach is complex, requiring multiple sources of data to accurately 
calculate a value that estimates the net economic benefits of either staying over a future 
period or leaving immediately.  To perform these calculations, ACOL programming must 
be able to project civilian earnings over the selected future horizon.  It must also project 
future military earnings, using historical promotion rates, over the same horizon.  These 
future earnings streams must be discounted to present values and require personal 
discount factors, Consumer Price Index (CPI) deflators, and estimates of the relevant time 
horizon, none of which are included in the data contained in the RMS.  A common 
problem associated with using an ACOL model is the difficulty in estimating and 
updating the expected civilian earnings streams. [Ref. 29, Ref. 30] There are usually 
variations in how civilian earnings and military pay are estimated and incorporated in an 
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ACOL variable, and it is not clear that the procedure for estimating and updating the 
ACOL variable can be easily automated for use in the RMS. [Ref. 28] 
In his 2001 survey of retention models, Mehay [Ref. 19] mentions two 
methods for calculating military-civilian pay ratios or indices.  The first and most widely 
used method calculates the current civilian earnings of veterans averaged across all of 
their respective civilian occupations.  This method provides a current measure of civilian 
pay that is more easily calculated than ACOL.  Also, averaging civilian pay over 
occupations may reduce selection bias because the civilian occupation that military 
leavers enter may be an outcome of this selection process. [Ref. 19] An alternative 
method is to calculate the pay ratio on an occupation-specific basis.  This method uses a 
conversion index to match military occupations to civilian occupations as classified in the 
monthly Current Population Surveys (CPS).  The CPS can then provide the average 
earnings for the civilian occupation(s) that is (are) comparable to each Navy rating.  
Hansen [Ref. 27] used this method in 2000 and found that some ratings do not have clear 
civilian counterparts, and some civilian occupations have too few observations to provide 
useful earnings data.   
A potential problem with using civilian pay comparisons in a retention 
model is the inclusion of variables for personal characteristics, including race, education, 
aptitude, or marital status, in the same model.  These characteristics are typically used to 
predict the civilian earnings component of the ACOL variable and thus may cause 
multicollinearity problems in a retention model. [Ref. 21, Ref. 27] Mehay’s survey [Ref. 
19] provides further discussion of this issue. 
Calculating a military-civilian pay ratio for each rating for every decision 
period contained in the analysis data set was a problem for this thesis.  The procedures 
required to calculate this ratio, or an ACOL variable, are beyond the scope of this thesis.  
However, data contained in the RMS do allow for a convenient merging of historical 
military pay information into the data set. The time period of a sailor’s decision point can 
be matched to a calendar year, and this can be used with paygrade and years of service to 
determine the base pay for a sailor when he or she made a reenlistment decision.  
However, a potential problem with using a simple military pay variable was discovered 
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during an initial analysis of the monthly base pay variable created for this data set.  The 
problem was there was little variation in the pay variable across the observations, since 
the vast majority (74.4 percent) of sailors in Zone A were in only two paygrades--E-4 and 
E-5.  Thus, to best capture the effects of military pay in this model, paygrade variables 
were used as proxies for military pay.  The variable E3B is coded as ‘1’ if the sailor is in 
paygrades E-1 through E-3 and ‘0’ otherwise.  The variables “E4,” “E5,” and “E6” are 
coded as ‘1’ if the sailor is in either one of the respective paygrades and ‘0’ otherwise.  
The paygrade variables are expected to have a positive effect on reenlistment when 
compared to lower paygrades and a negative effect when compared to a higher paygrade.  
For example, an E-4 is expected to be more likely to reenlist than an E-3 or below but 
less likely to reenlist than an E-5. 
b. Sea/Shore Duty 
In 1984, Warner and Goldberg [Ref. 20] used a variable to examine the 
effect of expected sea duty on a sailor’s decision to reenlist.  Their sea duty variable was 
defined as the proportion of personnel in a sailor’s rating who were on sea duty in the 
next four Length Of Service (LOS) groups (years) following the sailor’s LOS group (year 
of service) at the decision point.  They found that higher expected sea duty proportions in 
a given rating have a significant negative effect on first-term reenlistment rates.  That is, 
those sailors who faced the prospect of greater time at sea if they reenlisted were less 
likely to reenlist.  They interpreted this result to reflect the net distaste for sea duty and 
the accompanying family separation. 
Unlike the sea duty variable used by Warner and Goldberg, the sea/shore 
duty variables used in this model are not related to prospective sea duty.  While we agree 
that the rigors of sea duty tend to reduce a sailor’s propensity to reenlist, it is also 
possible that currently serving on shore duty (at the EAOS point) will tend to increase the 
reenlistment propensity, even if one faces the prospect of returning to sea.  Using an 
expected sea duty variable, as in Warner and Goldberg, assumes that a sailor at EAOS 
who is nearing the end of a shore duty assignment would be less likely to reenlist than a 
sailor at EAOS who is approaching the end of a sea duty assignment.  However, an 
opposite outcome is plausible: current shore duty may make service members “forget” 
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the negative aspects of sea duty, which occurred some time in the past, and thus make 
them more willing to reenlist than those currently on sea duty.  Generally, we expect 
sailors currently serving on shore to be more willing to reenlist, even if they do face 
extensive sea duty during the reenlistment term. 
The field “Onboard_Ss” from the RMS data set describes whether an 
individual was on sea, shore, or neutral duty at the time of his or her reenlistment 
decision.  Neutral duty is a type of shore duty that does not count against the shore 
portion of a required sea-shore rotation.  As such, neutral duty is considered shore duty 
for this analysis.  The variable we created, SEA, is coded as ‘1’ if the sailor was in a sea 
duty billet at the decision point and ‘0’ if the billet was shore duty.  The variable SHORE 
is coded just the opposite of SEA.   These variables were created for use in different 
models where the comparison group is the majority of the sample.  For example, if the 
majority of sailors in the analysis sample currently were assigned to shore duty billets, 
the variable SEA would be used in the model to examine the effects of being in the 
minority group.  Conversely, the variable SHORE would be used if the majority currently 
were assigned to sea duty billets.  Based on previous findings of sea duty effects and on 
anecdotal evidence, the hypotheses for these variables are that SEA will be negatively 
related to reenlistment compared to SHORE, or that SHORE will be positively related to 
reenlistment compared to SEA. 
c. Gender 
The variable FEMALE is used to examine the effects of gender on 
reenlistment.  FEMALE is coded as ‘1’ if the individual is a woman and ‘0’ if he is a 
man.  Prior studies have shown that women have a higher propensity to reenlist than men. 
[Ref. 7, Ref. 29]  This may possibly be attributed to increased opportunities for women in 
the military as compared to the civilian sector.  Consequently, the hypothesis for this 
variable is that a woman will be more likely to reenlist than a man. 
d. Family Status 
The family status variables used in this model were created from the 
“Pri_Dep” field of the RMS data set, and are combinations of marriage and dependent 
status.  SNC is coded as ‘1’ if the sailor is single with no children and ‘0’ otherwise; 
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SWC is coded as ‘1’ if the sailor is single with children and ‘0’ otherwise; MNC and 
MWC are coded as ‘1’ if the sailor is married without/with children, respectively, and ‘0’ 
otherwise.  Prior studies have found that married persons have a higher propensity to 
reenlist than those who are single. [Ref. 7, Ref. 20] In 1995, Quester and Adedeji [Ref. 
29] further concluded that Marines who were married or had dependents were more 
likely to reenlist than single Marines with no dependents.  Based on these prior findings 
and the notion that the Navy provides job security and medical benefits to sailors’ 
families, we hypothesize that sailors with dependents, either single or married, will be 
more likely to reenlist than single sailors with no dependents. 
e. Race/Ethnicity 
The set of race/ethnicity variables used in this model were created from 
the race and ethnicity fields of the RMS extract.  Hispanics were first separated from the 
group using the “Ethnic_Group_Actual” field, and the “Race_Actual” field was then used 
to create the remaining categories.  These categories are not designed to allow an 
individual to be included in more than one group.  The variables HISPANIC, BLACK, 
ASIAN, OTH, and WHITE are coded as ‘1’ if the person is in the respective group and 
‘0’ if he or she is not.  Based on prior studies that included race/ethnicity in their models 
[Ref. 7, Ref. 29] and the notion that minorities are likely to have better opportunities in 
the military versus the civilian sector, the hypotheses for HISPANIC, BLACK, ASIAN, 
and OTHER are that they will have a positive effect on reenlistment (compared to 
WHITE).  
f. SRB Multiple 
A difficulty arose in creating a variable that measures the SRB offered to 
each sailor.  The RMS extract contains a variable from the EMF (Srb_Level) that 
indicates the SRB level received by individuals who chose to reenlist.  To be useful for 
analysis, the variable needs to indicate what SRB level was offered to all sailors at the 
decision point regardless of whether or not they accepted the SRB.  SRB multiples that 
are offered can change on a monthly basis, making it difficult to track what SRB level an 
individual was offered at the decision point.  The Center for Naval Analyses provided a 
data file containing SRB multiples for all zones and all eligible ratings/NECs by month 
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from 1977 through 2001. [Ref. 31] The RMS extract contains rating information 
(Pres_Rate_Code_1_4) and up to 10 NECs for each sailor in the data set.  The RMS also 
contains a field that indicates the month and year (tp) of the sailor’s EAOS—that is, the 
month and year when he or she was faced with making a reenlistment decision.  This 
information was used to create the variable SRBM, which is defined as the maximum 
SRB multiple the individual was offered based on his or her rating and/or NEC during the 
month and year he or she made the reenlistment decision. The variable created to capture 
the effects of SRBs on reenlistment in this model is identical to those used in the prior 
literature. [Ref. 27, Ref. 29]  The reenlistment probability is expected to increase as the 
SRB multiple increases, all else equal. 
g. Unemployment 
Civilian unemployment rates are often included in retention models to 
examine the effects of the availability of civilian jobs on the reenlistment decision.  The 
unemployment statistics used in the literature range from Warner and Goldberg’s [Ref. 
20] use of national rates for specific age groups to Hansen’s [Ref. 27] use of 
unemployment rates in the individual’s home state at the decision point.  The assumption 
behind using home state information is that sailors in Zone A may look for prospective 
jobs in their home areas. However, in this analysis state unemployment information could 
not be merged with the RMS extract, since the RMS does not contain the EMF field 
“HOME_OF_RECORD,” which indicates an individual’s home of record.  Having the 
time period by month and year (tp) for the reenlistment decision did allow monthly 
national unemployment information to be added to each observation in the data set.   
Our hypothesis about the way that unemployment rates reflect the impact 
of the economy on reenlistment decisions differs somewhat from the literature.  We 
hypothesize that sailors are more likely to notice and react to trends in the economy over 
time than to the level of the unemployment rate at the exact point in time of their 
decision.  For this reason we created a variable UNEMP_CH12 that measures the change 
in the national unemployment rate over the 12-month period prior to the decision point.  
The rates used were monthly, seasonally adjusted, national, civilian unemployment rates 
for ages 20 and older.  The data were obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. [Ref. 
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32] Reenlistment is expected to be counter-cyclical: that is, reenlistment will decrease 
with a negative change in unemployment (i.e., when the unemployment trend is 
downward) and increase with a positive change (i.e., when the unemployment trend is 
upward). 
h. Other Explanatory Variables 
The literature supports the use of education and aptitude information in 
retention models. [Ref. 22] Mehay’s survey [Ref. 19] provides specific discussion of 
these variables, which include high school diploma status, higher education status, and 
AFQT scores, and these variables have been found to have significant effects on 
reenlistment decisions.  As mentioned previously, including these variables in a model 
with civilian pay variables could lead to multicollinearity problems.  The RMS contains 
the EMF fields “ED_YRS” and “AFQT_SCORE” variables that could be used to reflect 
this information, but EMF file managers pointed out that the accuracy of the data in these 
EMF fields is questionable. [Ref. 33] As a result, these variables were not part of the 
RMS extract used in this analysis and were not used in the retention model.   
3. Model Summary 
The final model used in this analysis is generally specified as: 
 
Reenlistment = f (Sea/Shore Duty, Gender, Family Status, Race/Ethnicity, 
Paygrade, SRB Multiple, Unemployment) 
 
Table 3.1 describes the analysis variables used in the reenlistment model, and the coding 
of each variable.  Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics for Zone A sailors who made a 
reenlistment decision during fiscal years 1995 to 2001. For comparison purposes, the 
sample for these statistics includes sailors in Zone A who extended their enlistments 
(N=179,316).  The average reenlistment rate for this group was 0.466, and the majority of 
these sailors were single with no children (57.9 percent), white (66.0 percent), in 
paygrade E-4 (58.6 percent), and male (86.4 percent).  Also, 73.3 percent of the sample 
was at sea at EAOS.  The average SRB multiple was 1.36 and the average percentage 
change in unemployment over the 12 months prior to a reenlistment decision was –0.245.  
That is, the unemployment rate fell on average by 0.25 percentage points over the 12-






Table 3.1.  Description of Analysis Variables     
Variable Value Relationship w/REENL 
Dependent Variable     
REENL =1 if reenlist   
Explanatory Variables     
Sea/Shore Duty     
SEAb =1 if sea duty - (Compared to SHORE) 
SHOREb =1 if shore duty + (Compared to SEA) 
Gender     
MALEa =1 if male   
FEMALE =1 if female + (Compared to MALE) 
Family Status     
SNCa =1 if single, no child   
SWC =1 if single, w/child + (Compared to SNC) 
MNC =1 if married, no child + (Compared to SNC) 
MWC =1 if married, w/child + (Compared to SNC) 
Race/Ethnicity     
WHITEa =1 if White   
HISPANIC =1 if Hispanic + (Compared to WHITE) 
BLACK =1 if Black + (Compared to WHITE) 
ASIAN =1 if Asian + (Compared to WHITE) 
OTH =1 if Other + (Compared to WHITE) 
Paygrade     
E3B =1 if E1-E3 - (Compared to E4 or E5) 
E4b =1 if E4 - (Compared to E5) 
E5b =1 if E5 + (Compared to E4) 
E6 =1 if E6 + (Compared to E4 or E5) 
SRB Multiple     
SRBM Max SRB multiple +  
 (Range: 0.0 - 8.5)   
Unemployment     
UNEMP_CH12 12 mo. Unemp. Ch. +   
aBase case    







Table 3.2. Descriptive Statistics of 
Analysis Variables, FY95-01a 
(N = 179,316).     
Variable Mean Std Dev
REENL 0.466 0.499 
SEA 0.733 0.442 
SHORE 0.267 0.442 
MALE 0.864 0.343 
FEMALE 0.136 0.343 
SNC 0.579 0.494 
SWC 0.045 0.206 
MNC 0.201 0.401 
MWC 0.176 0.380 
WHITE 0.660 0.474 
HISPANIC 0.106 0.308 
BLACK 0.175 0.380 
ASIAN 0.042 0.201 
OTH 0.016 0.126 
E3B 0.254 0.435 
E4 0.586 0.493 
E5 0.158 0.365 
E6 0.002 0.046 
SRBM (multiple) 1.362 1.788 
UNEMP_CH12 (%) -0.245 0.340 
aAll variables are binary except SRBM 
 and UNEMP_CH12  
 
Table 3.3 provides Zone A reenlistment, extension, and separation rates by 
analysis variable group for the analysis time period.  Reenlistment rates varied from 36.4 
percent to 59.5 percent, extension rates from 2.2 to 5.7 percent.  A Z-test for the equality 
of two proportions [Ref. 34] was conducted for each variable group to test for differences 
in the average reenlistment rates within the group.  In the family status, race/ethnicity, 
and paygrade groups, the rates for SNC, WHITE, and E4, respectively, were tested with 
the average rates for the rest of the group.  For each test the null hypothesis that the 
reenlistment rates were the same was rejected at the 0.01 significance level.  In other 
words, for sailors in Zone A who made reenlistment decisions from fiscal years 1995 to 
2001, a higher proportion of shore duty sailors reenlisted than sea duty sailors (Z = -
23.75, p-val = 0.000); a higher proportion of men reenlisted than women (Z = 2.77, p-val 
= 0.006); a higher proportion of sailors with dependents reenlisted than sailors with no 
dependents  (Z = 54.82, p-val = 0.000); a higher proportion of minorities reenlisted than  
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Table 3.3. Reenlistment, Extension, and 
Separation Rates for Analysis Variables 
FY95-01 (N = 179,316).   
 Reenl Ext Sep 
Group Rate Rate Rate 
SEA 0.449 0.027 0.524 
SHORE 0.512 0.041 0.447 
MALE 0.467 0.029 0.504 
FEMALE 0.458 0.045 0.497 
SNC 0.411 0.030 0.560 
SWC 0.527 0.046 0.427 
MNC 0.498 0.030 0.472 
MWC 0.595 0.034 0.371 
WHITE 0.431 0.024 0.545 
HISPANIC 0.464 0.033 0.503 
BLACK 0.567 0.057 0.377 
ASIAN 0.595 0.041 0.364 
OTH 0.463 0.028 0.509 
E3B 0.364 0.045 0.592 
E4 0.500 0.028 0.473 
E5 0.504 0.022 0.473 
E6 0.468 0.043 0.489 
 
 
whites (Z = 41.03, p-val = 0.000); and a higher proportion of E-4s reenlisted than sailors 
in other paygrades (Z = -34.13, p-val = 0.000).  These figures are consistent with the 
hypothesized effect of these variables with the exception of females, who were expected 
to reenlist at higher rates than men. 
Table 3.4 shows the trends in reenlistment, extension, and separation rates for 
each year contained in the data set.  Table 3.4 shows nearly a six percentage point drop in 
reenlistment rates between fiscal years 1997 and 1999, then a resurgence in reenlistment 
rates between 2000 and 2001.  The reenlistment rate appears to be somewhat higher in 
2001 than in any previous year.  The trend in the extension rate is slightly downward.  







Table 3.4. Zone A Reenlistment, Extension, and 
Separation Rates by Year.     
Fiscal  Reenl Ext Sep 
Year N Rate Rate Rate 
1995 25,982 0.482 0.042 0.476 
1996 23,478 0.474 0.037 0.489 
1997 28,519 0.417 0.034 0.549 
1998 25,241 0.424 0.032 0.544 
1999 24,077 0.414 0.028 0.559 
2000 24,613 0.472 0.024 0.504 
2001 27,406 0.572 0.021 0.407 
Total 179,316 0.466 0.031 0.503 
 
D. STATISTICAL MODEL 
The dependent variable used in this model depicts a choice to either reenlist or 
leave the Navy.  A model is needed that best represents this type of behavior, since the 
outcomes of this decision are binary.  The cumulative logistic funcion is a functional 
relationship between a binary decision outcome, Di, and a set of explanatory variables 







where Pi is the probability that individual i chooses to reenlist (Di  = 1) given the k 
independent variables (Xi) in the model, and Zi is the cumulative logistic function.  If a 
linear probability model (LPM) is used to model this type of behavior, the resulting 
coefficients may produce estimates for Di that are outside the meaningful range of values 
[1,0].  The characteristic S-shape curve of the logit is used often to represent behavioral 
decision models and does not have the same problem with unboundedness that the 
simpler LPM has with a binary dependent variable. [Ref. 35]  Figure 3.1 provides a visual 
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The estimated coefficients (βk) from this logistic equation describe the change in 
the log of the odds of reenlisting caused by a one-unit change in the respective 
independent variables, holding the other variables constant.  Since this does not provide 
any specific insight as to how an individual’s behavior is affected by each variable, the 
partial effects of each characteristic on the reenlistment decisions of a reference “base 
case” or “notional” person must be computed.  By changing the value of each variable 
from its “notional” value, one can examine the marginal (or partial) effect of the 
explanatory variable on reenlistment.  The partial effect measures the change in the 
probability of reenlistment for a one-unit change in the respective independent variable.  
If the explanatory variable is binary, the partial effect measures the impact of going from 
zero to one. 
The estimates of a logit model can be tested for overall “goodness-of-fit” by using 
the –2 Log Likelihood statistic.  This statistic has a chi-square distribution under the null 
hypothesis that all of the explanatory variables in the model have coefficients of zero. 
[Ref. 36] The resulting score has an associated probability, or p-value, of obtaining that 
score or higher given that the null hypothesis is true.  Generally, if this p-value is less 
than 0.1, the statistic is considered significant, and the null hypothesis can be rejected.  
Rejecting the null hypothesis in this case indicates that the model has some explanatory 
power.  Researchers often use the percentage of correct classifications as another 
goodness-of-fit measure for logit models.  This metric is based on a cutoff percentage 
Di = 1 
Figure 3.1. Logit – LPM Comparison.  [After Ref. 
35: Fig. 13.2]. 







value for Pi used to determine what estimates for Di are classified as ‘1’ or ‘0’.  If, for 
example, the cutoff for Pi were 0.5, then Di would be ‘1’ for values of Pi greater than or 
equal to 0.5, and Di would be ‘0’ for values of Pi less than 0.5.  The percent correctly 
classified would be the ratio of the number of observations that were correctly classified 
to the total number of observations in the sample. 
The actual specification of the logit model in this thesis is: 
 




where Pi is the probability of reenlistment and the explanatory variables are defined in 
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This chapter analyzes the results of applying the theoretical model developed and 
specified in Chapter III to the analysis data set.  The data used were extracted from the 
RMS with the intent to examine the strengths and weaknesses of the current PerSMART 
structure in supporting retention modeling.  The analysis data set includes only sailors in 
SRB Zone A who made a decision to reenlist or separate during fiscal years 1995 through 
2001, and the focus of the analysis is on the effects of SRBs on reenlistment  
B. MODEL GROUPS 
The data set extracted from the RMS provides excellent analysis opportunities, 
since the Zone-A grouping alone contains actual reenlistment data for more than 90 
different enlisted ratings.  Modeling each rating individually would not be practical or 
possible, as few of the ratings by themselves have sufficient observations to support 
reliable maximum likelihood estimation.  In order to make use of as much of the data set 
as possible, the ratings need to be grouped in some logical fashion to provide for more 
reliable parameter estimates.  Warner and Goldberg in their 1984 study [Ref. 20] grouped 
all Navy ratings into 16 Navy occupational areas based on similarities in training, job 
requirements, and working conditions.  The groups they used are similar to the Enlisted 
Management Communities (EMC) that the Navy’s Military Personnel Plans and Policy 
Division (N13) currently uses to manage enlisted personnel programs. [Ref. 37]  Table 
4.1 shows the ratings and/or NECs associated with each EMC.   
The Enlisted Management Community organization is the basis for which the 
Navy ratings were grouped in this analysis.  The ratings in these communities all have 
similar jobs, skills and sea-shore rotations.  The 173,735 sailors who reenlisted or 
separated in Zone A between fiscal years 1995 and 2001 were assigned to groups 
according to the ratings and/or NECs in Table 4.1.  Table 4.1 includes the name of the 
community (e.g., Aviation Mechanical) in column 1, the variable name (AVMECH) in 
column 2, and the list of ratings/NECs contained in each occupational grouping in 
column 3.   
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Table 4.1.  Enlisted Management Communities 
Community Abbrev Rating/NEC 
Aviation Mechanical AVMECH AB ABE ABH ABF AD AF AM   
  AME AMH AMS AO AS PR 
Aviation Technical/Aircrew AVTECH AC AE AG AT AV AW AZ 
Surface Main Propulsion SMPROP GS GSM GSE EN MM BT 
Surface Hull/Electrical SHELEC DC HT EM IC MR 
Surface Combat Systems SCSYS ET FC GM MN STG TM 
Surface Operations SOPER BM IT OS QM SM RM DP DS 
SpecWar/EOD/Diver SPEC Any Rating Except HM w/NECs 
  5332 5333 5334 5335 5336 5337 
  5320 5323 5326 
  5311 5341 5342 5343 5346 
  5350 5351 5352 
Cryptologic/Foreign Lang CRYPTO CTA CTI CTM CTO CTR CTT EW 
Submarine Personnel SUB ET(SS) FT MM(SS) MS(SS) MT  
  SK(SS) STS YN(SS) 
NUC NUC ET EM MM w/Nuclear NECs 
  3353 3354 3355 3356 3359 
  3363 3364 3365 3366  
  3383 3384 3385 3386 3389 
  3393 3394 3395 3396 
Admin/Media ADMIN DM JO PN PH RP YN 
Medical/Dental HEALTH HM DT (HN DN) 
Legal/Law Enforcement LAW LN MA NC NCCR 
Supply SUPPLY AK DK LI MS PC SH SK 
Seabees SEABEE BU CE CM CU EA DO EQ SW  
  UC UT CN 
Intel Specialist INTEL IS 
Note: Ratings in italics existed during the time period for this data set, but 
         have since been merged into other ratings in the same community. 
Source:[Ref. 4.2]   
 
In the downsizing period many ratings were either merged into a single rating or 
closed completely.  An example of this is the Boiler Technician (BT) rating that was 
merged with the Machinist Mate (MM) rating.  Some of the now obsolete ratings, such as 
Patternmaker (PM) and Opticalman (OM), could not be assigned to a current community 
and were dropped from the analysis.  Additionally, sailors with no rating in paygrades E-
1 through E-3 (nonrates) were not assigned to any group, since they were not eligible for 
an SRB and are not managed in the same manner as sailors with ratings.  Nonrates 
include Airman (AN), Seaman (SN) and Fireman (FN).  Three of the 16 communities-- 
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SpecWar/EOD/Diver, Legal/Law enforcement, and Intel Specialist-- were not used in this 
analysis because of the small sample sizes of each.  After deleting non-rates and the 
‘Specwar, Legal, and Intel’ groupings, the final analysis data set contained 151,554 
observations in 13 separate rating groups.   
Table 4.2 provides descriptive statistics of the analysis variables by Enlisted 
Management Community.  The Submarine personnel community had the highest 
reenlistment rate (0.636), while the Surface Hull/Electrical community had the lowest 
rate (0.382).  All but two communities, Cryptologic/Foreign Language and Health, had 
more sailors on sea duty than on shore duty.  This is as expected since CTs are typically 
assigned to shore-based communications facilities, and HMs/DTs are primarily assigned 
to Naval hospitals and dental clinics.  The Health community had the highest proportion 
of women (0.301), while Surface Combat Systems had the lowest (0.063) (excluding the 
Submarine and Nuclear communities, since women cannot serve on submarines).  Health 
had a greater proportion of married sailors (0.492) than other communities, and Surface 
Operations had the greatest proportion of single sailors (0.675).   
In all communities the majority of sailors were white single men with no children.  
Minority groups constituted the majority in the Supply community (0.535); the 
proportions of minority groups in Supply were: Hispanics (0.12), Blacks (.305), and 
Asians (0.097).  The Nuclear community had the largest proportion of petty officers (E-4 
through E-6) (0.994).  This is to be expected since nuclear trained sailors leave their 
initial schools as petty officers.  The 12-month unemployment rate for all communities 
was decreasing with the largest decrease for the Health community (-0.272 percentage 
points) and the smallest for the Surface Combat Systems community (-0.193 percentage 
points).  
Table 4.3 shows the percentage of each community eligible to receive an SRB 
during the time period (i.e., SRBM > 0.0).  Relatively few sailors in the Surface 
Hull/Electrical, Admin/Media, Health, and Supply communities were eligible for SRBs 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.3. Percentage of Sailors Eligible 
For SRB by Enlisted Management   
Community, Fiscal Years 1995-2001.  
    Percent   
EMC N Eligible   
AVMECH 20,770 56.80  
AVTECH 15,489 80.39  
SMPROP 12,924 74.14  
SHELEC 11,813 34.23  
SCSYS 14,255 72.20  
SOPER 18,312 73.01  
CRYPTO 5,988 85.35  
SUB 7,640 96.83  
NUC 7,465 100.00  
ADMIN 7,328 0.52  
HEALTH 13,415 19.62  
SUPPLY 11,914 15.50  
SEABEE 4,241 60.46   
 
Table 4.4 shows the average SRB multiple for each community by fiscal year.  
The SUB and NUC communities had the highest average SRB award levels during this 
period, while Admin, Health, and Supply had the lowest.   
 
Table 4.4. Average SRB multiples by Enlisted Management 
Community. 
EMC FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 
AVMECH 0.40 0.12 0.42 0.63 1.25 1.72 2.08 
AVTECH 1.19 1.50 1.73 1.77 1.95 2.28 2.62 
SMPROP 0.57 0.78 0.92 1.42 1.56 1.61 1.69 
SHELEC 0.49 0.49 0.12 0.03 0.18 0.38 0.60 
SCSYS 0.69 1.67 2.63 2.64 2.85 3.60 3.77 
SOPER 1.52 1.45 1.01 1.65 2.13 2.10 2.00 
CRYPTO 0.95 2.11 2.64 2.43 2.86 3.28 3.60 
SUB 1.97 2.48 2.56 2.49 4.07 5.01 4.96 
NUC 4.08 4.05 4.66 5.43 7.22 7.43 6.96 
ADMIN 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.00 
HEALTH 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.43 0.39 0.41 
SUPPLY 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.19 0.22 0.28 





C. MODEL ANALYSIS 
The reenlistment model specified in Chapter III was estimated for each of the 13 
selected Enlisted Management Community groups.  The estimating equations are 
nonlinear and are estimated by maximum likelihood techniques using the SAS statistical 
software package.  Estimated coefficients indicate the magnitude and direction of the 
statistical relationship between the explanatory variables and the log-odds of reenlisting.   
As mentioned in Chapter III, the estimated coefficients from the logit model 
describe the change in the log of the odds of reenlisting associated with a change in a 
given explanatory variable, holding the other variables constant.  Since this does not 
provide any specific insight as to how an individual’s behavior is affected by each 
variable, the partial effects of each characteristic on the reenlistment decisions of a 
reference or “notional” person must be computed.  Because the functional form of the 
logit equation is nonlinear, the value of the partial effects depends on where the logit 
model is evaluated.  The “notional” sailor used in this analysis for evaluating partial 
effects has characteristics matching the modal value for categorical variables and the 
mean value for continuous variables.  For example, the “notional” sailor for the Health 
community was a single white male E-4 on shore duty.  His SRB multiple was at the 
mean of the community (0.374), and he saw a 0.253 percentage point decrease in 
unemployment over the 12 months prior to his reenlistment decision.  The partial effects 
of explanatory variables on this “notional” sailor’s probability of reenlisting are evaluated 
by changing binary variables from ‘0’ to ‘1,’ increasing his SRB multiple by one level to 
1.374, and decreasing the magnitude of the unemployment rate change by 0.2 percentage 
points to –0.053. 
Table 4.5 presents the logit coefficients for each of the 13 community models.  
Table 4.4 also shows the partial effect for each coefficient.  The specification for all 
models is the same except where SHORE was used as the comparison group in the 
Cryptologic/Foreign Language and Medical/Dental communities, and E5 was used as the 
comparison group in the Nuclear community.  In general, the estimates reveal that higher 
SRB multiples and rising unemployment rates are associated with higher probabilities for 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   

















































































































































without dependents. Evaluation of the models and a fuller discussion of the results are 
provided below. 
1. Goodness-of-Fit 
An ultimate goal in developing a behavioral model should be specifying 
explanatory variables that are theoretically sound and relevant to the problem being 
analyzed.  Prior literature indicates that the variables used in these models are 
theoretically important factors in estimating the probability of reenlistment.  In all but one 
of the 13 community models, the majority of variables are statistically significant.   
All of the models had a high chi-square score that tests the null hypothesis that all 
of the explanatory variables in the model have coefficients of zero.  In all cases this null 
hypothesis was rejected at the 0.01 significance level, indicating that all of the models 
had some explanatory power.  The percentage of correct classifications was examined for 
each model at a cutoff value of 0.5 and results ranged from a low of 58.9 percent in the 
Aviation Technical community model to a high of 76.2 percent of correct classifications 
in the Nuclear community model.  These figures can be compared to the “naïve” 
prediction rule that assumes everyone follows the majority (i.e., everyone would separate 
if the majority of sailors in the community actually separated).  For example, the majority 
of sailors in the Surface Main Propulsion community separated (54.4 percent).  The 
“naïve” prediction for this community would be that all sailors will separate, and it would 
correctly classify 54.4 percent of the predictions.  The actual logistic model for the 
SMPROP community correctly predicted 64.6 percent of the cases.  Comparing the two 
predictions shows that the model performs better than the “naïve” prediction.  This same 
comparison was made for each logit model, and all logit models were found to predict 
better than the prediction based on a “naïve” approach. 
All explanatory variables were examined for correlation, and an ordinary least 
squares regression was performed on this model to examine any multicollinearity 
conditions between the explanatory variables.  The variables FEMALE and SEA/SHORE 
were significantly correlated (0.31 < |r| < 0.40) in the Surface Operations, 
Cryptologic/Foreign Language, Admin/Media, Medical/Dental, and Supply community 
models.  The SRB and unemployment variables showed similar correlation (0.30 < |r| < 
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0.40) in seven of the models.  The variance inflation factors (VIF) for the models in these 
cases were higher for the variables as well, indicating possible multicollinearity in the 
affected models.  This is not considered a serious problem, however, as multicollinearity 
affects the standard errors of parameter estimates, but the parameters themselves remain 
unbiased. 
2. Effects of Explanatory Variables 
a. Sea/Shore Duty 
Sea and shore duty have a significant effect on reenlistment in 11 of the 13 
communities.  Eight of the models support the hypothesized negative effect of current sea 
duty on retention.  That is, in eight models those currently (at EAOS) on sea duty are less 
likely to reenlist than those currently on shore duty.  A surprising finding, however, is 
that shore duty has a negative effect on reenlistment in three of the communities: 
Submarine Personnel, Admin/Media, and Supply.  That is, those currently on shore duty 
who face going to sea are less likely to reenlist than those on sea duty.  The results from 
these three models indicate that sailors in these communities either prefer sea duty and 
dislike shore duty, or that the prospect of sea duty reduces their likelihood of reenlisting.  
The latter is likely to be more correct and would support Warner and Goldberg’s [Ref. 
20] use of a prospective sea duty variable.  Of the significant estimates, shore duty has an 
average effect of +8.5 percentage points on “notional” reenlistment rates (or that sea duty 
decreases the likelihood of reenlisting by 8.5 percentage points).  Warner and Goldberg 
found that a 10 percent increase in the fraction of expected time at sea reduces 
reenlistment rates by only 1.6 percentage points.  The implication of the highly negative 
effects of sea duty in this analysis are that SRBs would have to increase reenlistment 
rates by more than 8.5 percentage points in sea duty assignments. 
b. Gender 
Gender is one of the less important explanatory variables across the 
models; FEMALE is significant in only seven of the 13 models.  Three of the 
communities where gender is not significant (Surface Operations, Cryptologic/Foreign 
Language, Admin/Media) have a high correlation between females and shore duty.  
Females were less likely to reenlist than males in six of the seven models that had 
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significant coefficients, and this is supported by the significantly lower reenlistment rates 
for women during this time period.  The Nuclear community shows a drastic difference in 
the effects of gender than the other communities.  Women in the Nuclear community 
with “notional” characteristics are 27.3 percentage points more likely to reenlist than 
males, although the proportion of women in this community (1.7 percent) is much lower 
than in other communities.  
c. Family Status 
All of the family status variables were very consistent across the 
communities.  SWC, MNC, and MWC all show a positive effect on reenlistment rates.  
The average partial effects on reenlistment rates over the “notional” predicted values 
across significant models are 10.3, 8.4, and 17.8 percentage point increases, respectively, 
for sailors who are single with children, married without children, and married with 
children.  These values, however, may be biased due to the naïve variables used to 
capture the effects of military pay in this model.  Since the paygrade variables used in the 
models do not completely account for all aspects of military pay, the coefficients of the 
family status variables probably absorb much of the effects of additional fringe benefits 
accruing to sailors with dependents. 
d. Race/Ethnicity 
The set of race and ethnicity variables indicates significantly higher 
reenlistment rates for Hispanics, Blacks, and Asians as compared to Caucasians.  The 
variable for “other” races is significant in only three of the models.  This is likely due to 
the small number of sailors in this category for all communities.  Averages of the 
significant partial effects for Hispanics, Blacks, and Asians indicate that they are 6.3, 
19.4, and 21.1 percentage points, respectively, more likely to reenlist than “notional” 
white sailors. 
e. Paygrade 
The set of paygrade variables shows that, for most communities, sailors in 
paygrades E-3 and below behave as expected and have lower reenlistment probabilities 
than “notional” E-4’s.  The exceptions to this are in the Cryptologic/Foreign Language, 
Submarine Personnel, and Nuclear communities.  Here those in grades E1-E3 are more 
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likely to reenlist than sailors in higher paygrades.  The variable for E-5s is significant in 
11 of the groups where it was compared to E-4s, and the coefficient is generally positive. 
However, two of the communities (Surface Combat Systems, Submarine Personnel) show 
lower reenlistment rates for E-5s compared to “notional” E-4s.  The Nuclear community 
has the most dramatic differences from expectations with E-3s and E-4s having 24.6 and 
50.9 percent higher probabilities of reenlisting, respectively, than “notional” E-5s.  The 
variable for the E-6 paygrade is significant in only one of the models.  Descriptive 
statistics show that there are few observations in this category across all of the 
communities.  Unfortunately, this naïve use of paygrade variables as proxies for military 
pay does not capture the full effects of pay on reenlistment as would a more sophisticated 
civilian-military pay ratio ACOL variable. 
f. SRB Multiple 
The estimated coefficient of the SRB multiple variable is significant in all 
but three of the 13 models.  As Table 4.4 depicts, very few sailors in the Admin/Media, 
Medical/Dental, and Supply communities are ever eligible for any level of SRB, and this 
is likely the reason that SRBs have no effect on reenlistment in these groups.  The partial 
effects of a one-level SRB increase on the “notional” reenlistment rate for the community 
range from +0.8 percentage points in the Cryptologic/Foreign Language community to 
+10.4 percentage points in the Seabee community.  The average increase in reenlistment 
probabilities due to a one-level increase in SRB multiples across all significant models is 
3.6 percentage points.  This effect is consistent with Warner and Goldberg [Ref. 20] who 
found an average 3.2 percentage point increase across 15 of their occupational groups.  
Table 4.6 shows the predicted probabilities for reenlistment in each community with 
different SRB multiples. 
A difference between the Warner and Goldberg study and this analysis is 
that their study used an ACOL variable.  To estimate the effects of a one-level increase in 
the SRB multiple, they increased the military pay portion of the ACOL variable by an 
equivalent monetary value.  Another difference with their study is that the lowest average 
SRB multiple of any of their occupational groups was 1.1, and the highest was just 4.2.   
 
 50
Table 4.6. Predicted Probabilities for Reenlistment for Each EMC  
by SRB Multiple.               
EMC 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 
AVMECH 0.301 0.348 0.399 0.452 0.506 0.560 0.612 0.662 0.709 
AVTECH 0.339 0.358 0.377 0.397 0.418 0.438 0.459 0.480 0.500 
SMPROP 0.270 0.293 0.318 0.343 0.369 0.396 0.423 0.451 0.480 
SHELEC 0.229 0.267 0.308 0.353 0.401 0.450 0.500 0.550 0.600 
SCSYS 0.374 0.431 0.489 0.547 0.605 0.659 0.710 0.756 0.796 
SOPER 0.322 0.342 0.363 0.385 0.407 0.429 0.451 0.474 0.497 
CRYPTO 0.498 0.506 0.515 0.523 0.531 0.540 0.548 0.556 0.565 
SUB 0.443 0.469 0.495 0.521 0.547 0.572 0.598 0.622 0.647 
NUC 0.116 0.123 0.130 0.139 0.148 0.157 0.166 0.176 0.187 
ADMIN 0.469 0.473 0.477 0.481 0.485 0.489 0.494 0.498 0.501 
HEALTH 0.432 0.430 0.429 0.427 0.425 0.424 0.423 0.421 0.419 
SUPPLY 0.409 0.425 0.442 0.459 0.477 0.492 0.510 0.527 0.544 
SEABEE 0.391 0.494 0.597 0.692 0.773 0.838 0.887 0.922 0.948 
 
There is a much larger variation in SRB multiples with the groups in the data used in this 
thesis.  
Comparing Table 4.4 with the partial effects of SRBM in the different 
models, it appears there may be some correlation over time between the size of the 
estimated effect and the consistency of the SRB multiples.  Communities that 
experienced large increases in their average SRB multiples over the time period (i.e., 
Surface Combat Systems, and Seabee) also have large partial effects for the SRB 
multiples.  Similarly, communities that have consistently higher SRB multiples over the 
time period show smaller effects on reenlistment by SRB multiples.  Nuclear sailors 
always have a relatively high SRB multiple, and all of them receive a bonus if they 
reenlist.  Since all of them can receive a bonus there is little variation in the SRB 
multiples within the community. 
For additional analysis, all models were estimated by fiscal year to 
examine any trends in the partial effects of SRBs on reenlistment.  Table 4.7 shows the 
results of this analysis.  As Table 4.7 shows, in many years the coefficients of SRBM are 
insignificant.  Often this is due to small sample sizes for each fiscal year – EMC cell.  No 
discernable trends were found to exist, but the results emphasize the value of aggregating 
data on reenlistment decisions over time to increase sample size and variation in the 
explanatory variables. 
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Table 4.7. Partial Effects of SRBM on Reenlistment by Fiscal Year. 
EMC FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01
AVMECH 0.050 0.131 0.141 0.097 0.038 0.018 0.046
AVTECH 0.056 0.036 0.052 0.022 0.026 0.024 ---
SMPROP 0.020 0.025 0.065 0.031 --- -0.033 ---
SHELEC 0.035 0.040 0.109 --- -0.031 -0.044 ---
SCSYS --- --- 0.047 0.053 0.075 0.077 0.067
SOPER --- 0.044 0.102 0.028 0.019 --- ---
CRYPTO --- 0.031 --- 0.033 0.033 --- ---
SUB -0.040 -0.042 --- --- 0.021 0.021 ---
NUC --- 0.064 --- --- -0.029 --- 0.093
ADMIN --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
HEALTH --- -0.025 --- --- -0.040 --- 0.036
SUPPLY 0.110 --- --- --- --- --- ---
SEABEE --- 0.235 0.086 0.131 0.171 0.153 ---
Note: Blank value indicates coefficient of SRBM is not significant.  All values shown are 
         significant at 0.1 level or better.     
 
g. Unemployment 
The estimated effects of civilian unemployment rate changes are positive, 
but significant in only 5 of the 13 models.  Part of the reason for so few significant effects 
across the models could be the state of the national economy over the analysis time 
period.  From 1995 to 2000 the national unemployment rate was trending downward; it 
was always below 5.0 percent and reached a low of 3.4 percent in 2000. [Ref. 32] The 
likelihood of finding a civilian job was high throughout the entire period, and small 
variations in such low and declining unemployment rates probably had little effect on 
reenlistment decisions.  The significant positive partial effects of this variable on 
“notional” reenlistment rates range from +0.4 to +2.2 percentage points, with an average 
effect of increasing reenlistment by 1.0 percentage point.  Over a similar time period, 
Hansen [Ref. 27] found that an extremely large, 5.0 percentage point, increase in the 
unemployment rate would increase reenlistment by only 1.0 percentage point.  A study 
by Quester and Adedeji [Ref. 29] and another by North [Ref. 30] found reenlistment rate 
increases for Zone A Marines of 0.6 and 1.5 percentage points, respectively, for a 1.0 
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This thesis to provided information on data fields, data sources, and modeling 
approaches to support the development of a Retention Modeling Module (RMM) in the 
PerSMART data warehouse.  A literature review examined existing research on turnover 
and retention in both civilian and military organizations. It also examined the current 
structure of the PerSMART data warehouse and its ability to support retention modeling.  
To this end, a first-term reenlistment model was estimated using data extracted from the 
RMS in PerSMART.  Finally, alternative sources of data necessary for retention 
modeling were investigated. 
The literature review focused on variables frequently used in prior studies to 
explain the retention behavior of sailors at the first-term reenlistment point.  A primary 
focus of the literature review was the various modeling techniques that have been used in 
prior studies to capture the effects of military compensation on retention behavior.  The 
vast majority of retention studies utilize an ACOL approach to explain the effect of 
compensation on retention behavior. 
Data was extracted from PerSMART on all enlisted personnel who made the 
decision to reenlist, extend, or separate from the Navy during FY 1995 through FY 2001.  
This data was then further reduced for analysis to include only Zone A sailors who were 
eligible to reenlist and who had at least two but not more than six years of service.  
Sailors who extended their service obligations vice reenlisting for another full term were 
excluded from the data set. 
A multivariate model was specified for the purpose of explaining the effects of 
military pay and bonuses on retention behavior.  The model was applied to the analysis 
data set, which was broken down into 13 occupational groups based on the Enlisted 
Management Communities used by the Navy’s Military Personnel Plans and Policy 
Division (N13).  Results indicated that, for most communities, paygrade has a positive 
effect on reenlistment when compared to lower paygrades and a negative effect when 
compared to a higher paygrade.  For example, an E-4 is more likely to reenlist than an E-
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3 or below but less likely to reenlist than an E-5.  Analysis also showed that SRBs have a 
significant impact on retention.  Across occupational groups, the average effect of a one-
level increase in the SRB multiple was a 3.5 percentage point increase in the probability 
of reenlistment for Zone A sailors. 
B. CONCLUSIONS  
Although the results of this analysis with regard to the statistical effects of SRBs 
on retention were significant and consistent with prior studies, the estimating model itself 
was limited in its ability to capture the true effects of total military compensation on 
retention behavior.  This is in part due to the naïve use of the explanatory variable 
paygrade as a proxy for expected military pay.  This likely led to a downward bias of the 
effects of SRBs due to other explanatory variables, such as family status, picking up 
some of the pay effects.  Sailors with dependents are paid more than their counterparts 
with no dependents.  Without a pay variable that accounts for these differences, estimates 
of the effect of family status on reenlistment will include the effect of the pay differential 
between sailors with and without dependents.  The use of paygrade as an explanatory 
variable also does not lend itself to an evaluation of the retention impacts of various pay 
and other programs and policies that may be implemented by the Navy.  The model used 
in this analysis would benefit greatly from implementing the ACOL approach to explain 
the effect of compensation on retention, as previous studies have done.  ACOL is the 
generally accepted method for best capturing these effects.  Additionally, although this 
model contained a variable for civilian employment opportunities in the form of 
unemployment rate changes, more comprehensive civilian comparison data, such as 
projected civilian earnings, are needed to better capture the effects of the economic 
environment on reenlistments.   
Despite the limitations of this model, the analysis has shown that the current 
structure of PerSMART can be successfully accessed to provide most of the data required 
for estimating future retention models.  The data fields extracted from the RMS, in 
particular the Time Period field (tp), were convenient for merging the data with other 
sources of information, such as SRB, unemployment, and basic pay tables.  However, 
RMS can be limited by the data it receives from the EMF.  The EMF is dynamic in that it 
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undergoes constant updating from its source inputs.  These daily updates and revisions 
often contain errors which degrade the quality of the data contained in the RMS. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
First, any modeling approach used to explain retention behavior should have 
ACOL as the key explanatory variable to capture the full effects of military compensation 
within the context of a structural economic model.  ACOL modeling has been found to be 
the most precise method for predicting retention behavior, although it may be difficult to 
implement.  Developers have indicated that an ACOL variable may not be easily 
automated for use in the RMS because of significant differences in how civilian earnings 
and military pay are included in the structure of the variable. [Ref. 28] If ACOL cannot 
be modeled in the RMS then a military-civilian pay ratio variable should be used.  The 
Marine Corps in its models to forecast the impact of changes in SRB multiples currently 
uses this variable. [Ref. 19]  Using a pay ratio variable in the RMS would require a table 
of current and historical civilian earnings.  The civilian earnings in the Marine Corps 
model are the usual weekly earnings of full-time 20-to-24-year-old wage and salary 
workers.  This information is available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics in a quarterly 
report titled Weekly Earnings of Wage and Salary Workers. [Ref. 30] 
In addition to the civilian earnings requirements for a pay variable, other data 
sources need to be incorporated into the RMS.  These include SRB, unemployment, and 
basic pay tables.  The table used to match SRB multiples to sailors in this analysis were 
provided by the Center for Naval Analyses. [Ref. 31]  This table includes SRB multiples 
by month and zone for all eligible ratings and NECs from 1977 through 2001.  Current 
and historical unemployment data is available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
website. [Ref. 32] This website provides local, state, and national unemployment 
information by month and year for nearly every combination of demographics and 
occupational areas.  If future models use state unemployment information the EMF field 
“HOME_OF_RECORD” will need to be included in the RMS to match rates to 
individuals.  The Defense Finance and Accounting Service has a website with military 
pay tables dating back to 1949. [Ref. 38] Their website also provides information on all 
other forms of compensation including housing allowances and special pays. 
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Incorporating these data requirements and a sophisticated variable like ACOL into 
the RMS will make it an invaluable asset to analysts as well as policy makers.  Having a 
near-real-time decision support system such as this will enable the Navy leadership to 
make better informed policy decisions regarding the implementation of pay and retention 
programs and their effects on Navy retention. 
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APPENDIX.     RMS EXTRACT DATA FIELDS 
 
 
The following is an alphabetical listing and description of the data fields in the 
RMS data extract available for this analysis.  Several fields are associated with a time 
period for an event.  These time periods are used as a means to compare event dates and 
consist of a four-digit number that represents a specific month and year.  For example, 
time period number 1153 equates to January 1996.   Based on this, time period number 
1152 equates to December 1995, and number 1154 equates to February 1996. 
 
Data Field Description 
Adsd Active Duty Service Date. 
Adsd_Tp Time period for Adsd. 
Br_Cl Branch and Class of Service. 
Ced Current Enlistment Date. 
Ced_Tp Time period for Ced. 
Date_Of_Birth_Actual Birth date of member as per contract. 
DecisionFiscalYear Fiscal year of decision to reenlist/extend/separate 
Dod_Loss_Code Type and reason for release from active duty or 
separation. 
Eaos Expiration of Active Obligated Service. 
Eaos_Tp Time period for Eaos. 
Enl_Mgmgt_Community Enlisted management community. 
Ethnic_Group_Actual Ethnic group for individual. 
Individual_Id RMS database identifier for individual. 
LOS Length of Service. 
Lcdo_Tp Time period for Loss_Change_Date_Of_Occurrence. 
Loss_Change_Date_Of_ 
  Occurrence 
Date of loss from the Navy. 
Loss_Chg_Code Navy Loss Code for reason member was lost. 
Navy_Loss_Rqc Recommendation of last duty station regarding the 
reenlistment of member. 
Nbr_Dep_Residing_ In_ 
  Household 
Total authorized dependents sponsor has residing with 
him/her at current duty station. 
Nec1 to Nec10 Navy Enlisted Classification code assigned to member. 
Nec_Tp1 to Nec_Tp10 Time period associated with respective Nec. 
Oex Length in months of current operative extension to 
enlistment. 
Oex_Date Operative extension effective date. 
Oex_Date_Tp Time period for Oex_Date 
Onboard_Actual_Uic  UIC for activity to which member is currently assigned. 
Onboard_Ss  Sea/shore duty code for onboard activity. 
Pebd                      Pay Entry Base Date. 
Pebd_Tp  Time period for Pebd. 
Pres_Rate_Code_1_4  4-digit code identifying member’s present rating. 
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Data Field Description 
Pres_Rate_Code_Pg  Code identifying member’s present paygrade. 
Pri_Dep  Number and type of primary dependents (spouse and 
children) member has. 
Race_Actual  Race code for individual. 
Sec_Dep Number and type of secondary dependents (parents) the 
member has. 
Sex_Actual                 Gender. 
Soft_Eaos  Terminal date of member’s total active duty obligation; 
includes executed agreements to extend enlistment. 
Soft_Eaos_Tp  Time period for Soft_Eaos 
Srb_Level  Multiplier in effect at the time the member’s entitlement 
to SRB was established. 
Srb_Skill_Rating_Assgn Indicates whether or not the member is serving in a rating 
or NEC on which entitlement to SRB is based. 
Srb_Zone_Ind Zone of SRB eligibility of member. 
Ssn_Actual  Social Security Number 
code Code assigned to member during RMS data extract to 
identify event as reenlistment, extension, or separation. 
los_date Beginning date used to establish LOS. 
los_tp Time period for los_date. 
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